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Representing the Worker: 
The Worker-Intellectual 
Alliance of the 1980s 
in South Korea 
NAMHEE LEE 
VyN JULY 6, 1986, THE Korea Daily {Choson ilbo) carried a one-sentence item at the 
bottom of its social page: a twenty-three-year-old female student from Seoul National 
University by the name of Kw?n had sued a detective of the Puch on Police, charging 
him with sexual torture during her recent detention ("Susagwan 6 my?ng kobal" [Six 
Detectives Sued], July 6, 1986, 11). This small news item was to rock Korean society 
for months. It was shocking that a young woman would go public with an accusation 
that was more likely to damage her own reputation than that of the accused.1 Fur 
thermore, she had voluntarily quit a prestigious university to work in a factory. 
While the mass media and the government provided the public with mostly 
tantalizing and "subversive" elements of her case, alternative narratives began to cir 
culate almost immediately from court proceedings, statements of defense lawyers, and 
the newsletters of a citizen support group that was organized soon after the suit 
("'Urid?l ?i ttal,' Kw?n-yang ?i chhikkin ch?lm?m" 1987, 567-81). What gradually 
emerged from these accounts was a composite portrait of a South Korean undongkwon 
of the 1980s. Literally meaning "those who are in the [democratization] movement 
sphere," the term undongkwon applied both to individual activists and to the democ 
ratization movement as a whole, whose articulated goal was to bring democracy, 
justice, and reunification to Korea. The term was often used outside the democrati 
zation movement to indicate disapproval; the state used it to emphasize its undesir 
ability, equating the undongkwon with antistate and procommunist elements. Indi 
vidual activists rarely used the term without a mixture of self-deprecation and irony, 
Namhee Lee (nlee@humnet.ucla.edu) is Assistant Professor of Modern Korean History in 
the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of California, Los Angeles. 
I would like to thank Andre Schmid for his encouragement in the earlier phase of this 
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There were several cases of rape and sexual abuse of female students by police as a routine 
tactic to intimidate students and keep them from demonstrating. Female students were forced 
to stand naked and submit to body searches, and they were subjected to verbal abuse and even 
brutal beatings (Asia Watch 1985, 104-5). It was not until the Kw?n case became public 
that these students too went public with charges of such abuses. 
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912 NAMHEE LEE 
as the implications of the term shifted often between positive and negative, between 
conviction and doubt. Although the term had variegated and conflicting receptions 
in Korean society, it nevertheless captured the Zeitgeist of the 1980s. 
Although her decision to go public with the charge of sexual abuse was indeed 
unprecedented, Kw?n was only one of an estimated three thousand undongkw?n in 
factories in the mid-1980s.2 Like most of the others, she had forged her identification 
card in order to obtain a factory job, thereby becoming a "student/worker"3 and 
"disguised worker" (wijang ch'wiopja), a criminal by law.4 Kw?n In-suk thus became 
an emblematic figure of South Korea in the 1980s, embodying the passion, the ideals, 
and the conflicting legacies of the 1980s' democratization movement. At that time, 
thousands of university students and intellectuals plunged into the world of the factory 
worker, forgoing university diplomas, job prospects, and middle-class lives in the 
hope of bringing about "revolution." Like Kw?n, at times these individuals had to 
endure extreme ordeals and insidious accusations.5 
The intellectuals' Gramscian aspiration to be connected with the workers was not 
of course unique to South Korea. Their models are numerous in history, the earliest 
perhaps being Errico Malatesta, the famous Italian anarchist who joined the Italian 
International in 1871 after abandoning medical school at the University of Naples 
and apprenticing himself as an electrician and gas fitter (Levy 1987, 159). Closer to 
our time, the Gui?ean revolutionary leader Amilcar Cabrai exhorted the intellectuals 
to "commit suicide as a class [and] be reborn as revolutionary workers" (1969, 110). 
In China the worker-intellectual alliance had been a pronounced feature from the May 
Fourth Movement of 1919 until the Communist victory of 1949 (Perry 1992, 154? 
55). In France of 1968, the working class was the "indispensable agency of revolution" 
for various groups (Brown 1974, 77-121). 
The effort of intellectuals to remake themselves as workers remains the most 
distinctive as well as most problematic feature of the South Korean democratization 
movement of the 1980s. The few existing Korean accounts of the democratization 
movement do not treat the alliance in its own right, however, and even the best 
2The exact number of students and university graduates who went into factories is difficult 
to determine, especially since most of them fabricated their identities in order to get factory 
jobs. In fact, the government's statistics are notoriously unreliable. Both the government and 
labor activists claimed that the actual number of students in factories was higher than the 
figures reported by various government agencies; this number of three thousand is an estimate 
from a source intimate with the South Korean labor movement (Ogle 1990, 99). 
3As many university students and graduates became labor activists in the early 1980s, 
terms denoting their university background began to circulate within the social movement 
and in public as well, such as "student/worker activist" {hak-ch'ul undonggd) or "intellectual/ 
worker activist" {in-ch'ul undonggd). Here, I use "intellectuals" narrowly to denote anyone with 
a 
university background, regardless of whether he or she received a diploma. 
4University graduates were not legally barred from working in factories, but starting in 
the early 1980s they were regarded as potential instigators in labor disputes and were weeded 
out in the application process. Thus, they resorted to forging their identity papers, a criminal 
offense in South Korea. Not every university graduate working at a factory, however, was an 
activist. It became increasingly difficult for college graduates to get white-collar jobs after 
1985, so many started to look for work in factories. Due to age limits in production work, 
often these graduates used young people's names and forged identification cards. 
5The government charged that the undongkw?n were exploiting even sex for their revo 
lutionary cause, and Kw?n's charge of sexual torture was a form of conscientization and a 
"strategy to undermine the public authority of the government" (" 'Undongkw?n, konggw?n 
ny?k mury?khwa ch'aekdong'" {'Undongkw?n, Plots to Incapacitate Public Power'], Choson ilbo, 
July 17, 1986, 11). 
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account of the labor movement presents the alliance exclusively in the context of the 
labor movement and as the unambiguous reflection and product of sociohistorical 
conditions (Koo 2001). This article attempts to show the alliance as a product of a 
complex web of discursive practices that arise not only in the specific sociohistorical 
structure of the 1980s but also in the "political culture" of the undongkwon in the 
post-Kwangju Uprising period. The democratization movement's privileging of the 
ideological position of labor and the exalted position of the worker betrayed a certain 
ambiguity of the undongkw?n's own stance vis-?-vis the working class. Therefore, 
the alliance was beset with the intellectuals' conflicting aspirations between Gramscian 
ideas of organic fusion and Leninist vanguardism, and labor at times became a purely 
discursive and symbolic figure for both the undongkw?n's raison d'?tre and the con 
dition of possibility of its revolutionary project. 
The 1980s' South Korean labor movement was one of the most successful labor 
movements in recent history. Intellectuals had a central role in its development. Their 
representation of workers, however, can be considered untenable and politically ille 
gitimate, the privileged speaking for the presumed voiceless. Current discussions on 
undongkwon in South Korea, for example, are thoroughly critical along these lines. 
Although this criticism is valid, I argue that engaging in this criticism without further 
analysis is also to some extent historically irresponsible. The intellectuals' various 
efforts in remaking themselves as workers deserve a careful interrogation of issues 
relating to the "politics of representation." 
The purpose of this article is not to provide a comprehensive or systematic analysis 
of the intellectuals' role in the labor movement in South Korea, but to raise questions 
such as the following: What is at stake in critically probing the intellectuals' repre 
sentation of workers in the social movement, a movement that by the late 1990s had 
undergone a profound transformation requiring a radical redefinition of visions, 
claims, and practices? In the context of the demise of the social movement and the 
accompanying shift of social paradigms in South Korea and in the intellectual context 
of the 
"post-Foucauldian" tendency to view representation as inherently suspect, what 
are the political and intellectual imports of bringing up the issue of representation? 
How might such a discussion attend to both the potency and the problematics of the 
undongkw?n's experience as individual and social transformation? 
This article consists of three parts. The first part briefly discusses the historical 
context of the alliance of the 1970s, then presents the sociopolitical conditions and 
the undongkw?n's inner dynamics in the post-Kwangju Uprising period as contrib 
uting to the particular form of worker-intellectual alliance of the 1980s. The second 
part of the article examines what I call the "discourse of moral privilege 
" 
as one of 
the predominant discursive practices of the undongkwon in the alliance. The third 
part considers the undongkw?n's representation of workers in the alliance both spe 
cifically in anecdotes, testimonies, and documents and, at the end of the paper, broadly 
in the context of contemporary debates of representation. 
Historical Context 
Alliance of the 1970s 
The distinctive nature of the South Korean worker-intellectual alliance is his 
torically constituted?that is, the workers with whom the intellectuals sought to 
become partners in revolution had a historically specific process of proletarianization. 
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The formation of the postcolonial working class from the outset contested the ideo 
logical foundation of the country's state building, anticommunism, and capitalist 
development (see Choi 1993). Three aspects of the historical development are relevant 
here. 
First, the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 was completed with 
the concomitant decimation of the once-militant labor unions, which were completely 
rooted out by right-wing groups supported by the United States Military Govern 
ment, which ruled South Korea from 1945 to 1948 (see K. Kim et al. 1985, vol. 1; 
Koo 1990, 677). This experience marked future efforts to mobilize labor as "com 
munist agitation," and even moderate trade unionism was regarded as politically 
suspicious (Koo 1990, 677). Workers in the 1970s, therefore, not only were a gen 
eration removed from the militant labor mobilization of the immediate post-1945 
period but also were without any social or collective memory of such a movement. 
Second, the South Korean state played a crucial role in allocating economic re 
sources and regulating nonmarket forces for rapid development. One of the conse 
quences of this interventionist policy in the industrialization process was its suppres 
sion of labor. The state set wages, regulated the labor supply, and repressed trade 
unions, leaving workers with little or no protection (see, among others, Song 1991a). 
Third, there was no form of labor organization in the 1970s other than the thor 
oughly regime-controlled Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) (Han'guk no 
dong chohap ch'ong y?nmaeng), an undemocratic, hierarchical body which through 
out its history had failed to represent the interests of workers (So 1988, 179-216). 
The FKTU's predecessor, the General Federation of Korean Unions (Taehan nodong 
ch'ong y?nmaeng), was created by conservative politicians who envisioned it as a 
counterforce against the politically active and militant National Council of Korean 
Trade Unions (Chos?n nodong chohap ch?n'guk p'y?ng?ihoe) (see K. Kim 1986, 
128-43). During the First Republic (1948-60), the FKTU became an instrument of 
the ruling Liberal Party, as well as the object of political spoils as "labor aristocrats." 
The FKTU as a political instrument of the ruling party continued throughout 
the Yushin period (1972-79), during which the Park Chung Hee regime held society 
together through terror and intimidation. Indeed, the FKTU was one of the first 
groups to issue a statement of support for the Yushin Constitution, even organizing 
its own 
"agitation team" to urge each union to promote Yushin. Under the slogan of 
"labor-management cooperation," the FKTU abandoned any pretense of working on 
the economic issues of workers (Chang 1985, 135). Furthermore, the FKTU became 
the instrument of the regime's suppression of labor unions?the case of Tong-il Tex 
tile being the prime example (see Ogle 1990, 84-86). 
In this context of severe working conditions, a repressive labor regime, historical 
suppression of the labor movement, and the workers' lack of organizational resources, 
South Korea's intellectuals assumed an unduly large role in the labor movement. In 
the 1970s and the early 1980s, intellectuals, university students, and Christian labor 
organizations such as the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) (Tosi san?p s?n'gyohoe) 
and Young Catholic Workers (Jeunesse ouvri?re chr?tienne tJOC]; K'atolik nodong 
ch ongny?nhoe), persistently raised issues of labor?low wages, harsh working con 
ditions, violation of the basic labor laws?through statements, manifestos, hunger 
strikes, prayer services, and street demonstrations (KSCF 1984a). The utterance of the 
words "labor" and 
"working class" by students, intellectuals, newspapers, journals, 
and popular magazines helped make the discourse of labor legitimate and public (for 
further discussion, see Lee 2001, chap. 8.) These activities were rather remarkable, 
given the absence of organizational links between the student movement and labor 
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organizations and the absence of leftist political organizations since the 1960s, in 
contrast to postwar Japan and Europe, for example (see Brown 1974; Shimbori 1971; 
Webler 1980). 
The university students said it best when they characterized their alliance with 
labor in the 1970s as "lateral support" (KSCF 1984a, 180). Students and intellectuals 
held demonstrations and hunger strikes whenever called for. They set up night schools 
and hoped to enlighten workers and stir their consciences. They staffed the UIM, 
JOC, Christian Academy, and labor research centers. They were vilified as procom 
munists and imprisoned along with workers. But, they did not necessarily think of 
their own activities as part of the labor movement, nor did they believe the issue of 
labor called for a fundamental rethinking of their own lives. When the time arrived 
to return to their schools or jobs, they gladly and "without much apparent agony" 
went back, as did many members of National Democratic Federation of Youth and 
Students (Minch onghangny?n), an organization accused of planning to overthrow the 
South Korean government in the 1970s (I. Kim 1985, 18-19). 
In the 1980s, however, sociopolitical factors as well as the undongkw?n's own 
internal dynamics propelled labor to the center of social movements. Within the 
democratization movement, involvement in labor (nodong hyonjang) became the most 
privileged form of praxis.6 Not only was the worker hailed as the true revolutionary 
subject, but labor also acquired the aura of the inevitability of a revolution. The most 
critical event in catapulting labor to the center of the democratization movement was 
the Kwangju People's Uprising in 1980. 
The Kwangju Uprising 
The Kwangju Uprising, initially an ordinary university students' demonstration 
demanding the lifting of martial law and general political reform, became a watershed 
event for South Korean society when it developed into a citywide rebellion that was 
brutally crushed by government troops. The Kwangju Uprising informed the post 
Kwangju social movement as a heroic narrative?forcefully articulating "who the real 
heroes were" and "who really fought" for the democratization. With the Kwangju 
Uprising, the intellectuals, who had long denigrated themselves as being egotistical, 
petty bourgeois, or "fanciful ideologists," proved their own fragility and cowardliness 
in times of revolution. The workers, by contrast, confirmed their ontological status 
as 
revolutionary "fighting material." 
Even before the Kwangju Uprising, the democratization movement as a whole 
had been obsessed with defining the true nature and concept of minjung. (The de 
mocratization movement is also known as the 
minjung movement.) Minjung, meaning 
"common people" in the everyday sense of the term, also came to have a specific 
historical import within the democratization movement as constituting true historical 
subjectivity?that is, people capable of rising up against the oppressive system. The 
6Although the literal meaning of hyonjang is "site" or "field," its import depends on the 
context and the word with which it is paired: it can be a place of happening, such as a 
construction site or an accident scene, or a place of historical importance. Hyonjang was used 
within the social movement to denote a place of work that one pursued with the democrati 
zation movement's goals in mind, and it had a strong connotation of "praxis" as opposed to 
"theory." As the unsavory term wijang ch'wiopja (disguised worker) was coined by the govern 
ment and mass media to impute criminality to working in a factory with a forged identity 
card, the undongkw?n's preferred term was "going to hyonjang" or hyonjang ch'wiop (factory 
employment). 
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Kwangju Uprising rendered the essential ambiguity of this term moot on the one 
hand and even more contentious on the other. The ordinary citizens of Kwangju rose 
up in arms to defend democracy, thereby affirming minjung as a historical subject. 
However, those who gathered in the provincial government building and were killed 
by government troops on the final day of the uprising were the very bottom stratum 
of this min jung, factory workers and lumpen proletariat. Very few intellectuals and 
students remained in the provincial building; furthermore, they had advocated the 
return of arms to the authorities, an act that the workers vehemently opposed at the 
time as giving in to the state. 
Thus, while the Kwangju citizens were projected within the minjung movement 
as true examples of minjung as historical subjects, the working class and lumpen 
proletariat's disproportional share in the sacrifice made the discourse of minjung more 
contentious.7 In the post-Kwangju period, "those who participated in Kwangju" be 
came a trope for the intellectuals' inherent weakness and the workers' inherent revo 
lutionary qualities?a trope that was hammered into the social science literature and 
the literary representation of the event. Those who fought and died in the provincial 
building became the ultimate heroes of the Kwangju Uprising. Defining those who 
died as the real makers of history is the central theme, for example, of a short story 
that appeared in 1988: "Remember those who remained in the provincial building. 
You have to remember who participated, who fought, and who died. . . . Then you 
will know what kind of people make history, . . . that knowledge will become your 
strength" (Hong 1988, 203). 
This "truth" of the Kwangju Uprising, however, was a source of immense shame 
for students and intellectuals. Among the post-Kwangju undongkwon, the educated 
and knowledgeable were equated with cowardice and impurity. University students 
and graduates frequently used self-deprecating terms such as "weakling intellectual" 
{hakppiri) and "watered-down ink" {mongmul) to refer to their reputed weakness. Those 
who survived the Kwangju massacre were burdened with the guilt of not having died. 
One university student from the city of Kwangju who was not even an undongkwon 
killed himself after a year of agonizing over his inability to stop the massacre (Sin 
1990a, 140). It was also widely assumed that the shame of fleeing Kwangju drove 
the former president of the Student Association of Ch?nnam University to his eventual 
death after a prolonged hunger strike in prison (see Lee 2001, 194). The leaders of 
the famous 1985 Daewoo Auto Strike confessed that their commitment to the labor 
movement was a way to overcome the "guilt that we did not participate in Kwangju 
and thought only about our own livelihood" (Sin 1990b, 167). 
Between Obligations and Privileges 
The overriding sense of guilt and despair in the aftermath of the Kwangju Up 
rising converged with post-1980 sociopolitical developments to produce a narrative 
of revolution. That is, the post-Kwangju social movement had to be completely and 
irrevocably transformed from that of the 1970s?it had to be "revolutionary." The 
7The most frequently quoted statistic indicates that workers, peasants, and "lumpen pro 
letariat" (this term was used in the cited source and indicated the unemployed and occasional 
manual laborers) accounted for 59.9 percent of the injured, 59-2 percent of the dead, 58 percent 
of the arrested, and 80 percent of the Mobile Strike Task Force during the Kwangju Uprising 
(Chung 1991, 207-8). As the state troops' indiscriminate killings continued, the citizens of 
Kwangju began to arm themselves and organized the Mobile Strike Task Force, a patrol unit, 
one day before the regular state army seized the city on May 26. 
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post-Kwangju revolutionary fervor generated its own culture and internal dynamics 
through which revolutionary ideals and sentiments were created and sustained. In the 
construction of an undongkwon identity and culture of the 1980s, two notions are 
symptomatic of the unremitting tension faced by undongkwon, both individually and 
collectively. One is that a truly committed undongkwon had to give up kidukkwon, 
privileges and rights that come with education and social background. The other is 
that the force of tangwisong, obligations which are obvious and evident, dictated that 
one give up such privileges and rights. For many undongkwon university students, 
the ultimate form of giving up privileges was to forgo a university diploma. But for 
many others, it also meant forgoing the chance to go abroad; to pursue a graduate 
program; to get married; or to become a doctor, a lawyer, or an artist. The force of 
obligation, however, was not always directed only to the undongkwon. In 1986, the 
year when Kw?n In-suk forged her identification card to work in a factory, another 
Seoul National University student, unable to resolve the tension between her wavering 
self and the 
"oppressive clarity" of the historical responsibility to engage in the social 
movement, threw herself into the Han River (Lee 2001, 31). 
Decimation of the Labor Movement 
The undongkw?n's self-generated political culture (to borrow the term used by 
Lynn Hunt [1984] in a different historical context) was sustained as well by the 
sociopolitical landscape of the period. The overwhelming sense of guilt and despair 
in the post-Kwangju period was heightened by the decimation of the labor movement. 
Chun Doo Hwan's ascendancy to the presidency in August of 1980 was preceded by 
a severe crackdown on labor, which continued after he became president. The Chun 
regime's labor policies, "the most restrictive and oppressive in South Korean history" 
(Hart-Landsberg 1993, 219), need not be detailed here. Union leaders were not only 
forcibly removed from their offices and sent to prison on various pretexts; they were 
also sent to the infamous 
"purification camps" run by the military and were subjected 
to harsh labor and physical abuse (see, among others, Ogle 1990; Asia Watch 1985). 
The widespread sense of failure following the Kwangju Uprising led to intense 
debates within the labor movement and social movements at large. Even prior to the 
Kwangju Uprising, there had been a long-standing debate on the merit of continuing 
with 
"political struggle"?that is, engaging the public with issues chiefly concerned 
with political reform. Some had argued that the democratization movement's failure 
to oppose the Normalization Treaty of 1965 between Japan and South Korea and 
Park Chung Hee's Yushin system revealed the limitations of political struggles. Also 
before the Kwangju Uprising, another group had begun to articulate that the principal 
agent of social change was the working class and that thus their most urgent task was 
to strengthen the labor movement. The group's members had concluded that they 
must avoid direct political confrontation with the regime and prepare themselves for 
involvement with labor. This group, which became known as the proponents of "field 
work" {hyonjang-non), advocated going into factories as factory workers (C. Yi 1988, 
25). 
The common criticism directed against these proponents of fieldwork is that they 
failed to produce any labor organizations, let alone any social changes, because they 
were preoccupied with their long-term strategy of preparation and were obsessed with 
the fear of exposure. Even though they lived as workers under the conviction that 
workers were the main agent of social change, for most of them the idea of a labor 
movement remained abstract and Utopian. Their presence in factories only added more 
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numbers to the swelling tide of workers but did little to change their thoughts, their 
vision, or their welfare (C. Yi 1988, 226).8 
The fieldwork proponents were primarily reacting against their own experience 
with the 1970s' student movement. The well-known labor activist Kim Mun-su is a 
case in point. At Seoul National University, where Kim was a freshman in 1970, the 
student leaders who insisted on the primacy of the labor movement vis-?-vis the social 
movement at large did not have a clue about life in a factory: "There was an abundance 
of theory but no praxis." Kim believed that political issues were a luxury with which 
only (idle) university students or the well-to-do concerned themselves: "When workers 
were busy just getting by with three meals a day and saving their own asses, why 
bother with politics?" (1986, 188). 
Yi T'ae-bok, another well-known labor organizer, had a similar experience with 
the student movement. Dismissed from a university in 1971, he was forcibly con 
scripted into the army. After witnessing the flagrant surrender of the student move 
ment in the aftermath of the Garrison Decree in 1971 and the disappointing behavior 
of the movement's erstwhile leaders (who were mobilized as speakers for a pro-Yushin 
lecture series), he concluded that the student movement was incapable of making real 
changes in society. Discipline and determination were lacking in the student move 
ment, Yi felt, and he vowed to cut all ties with it until he himself was firmly estab 
lished as a worker (1994, 265-66). 
The disappointing personal experience with the political thrust of the social move 
ments of the 1970s?largely represented by the university student movement?re 
inforced the importance of "preparation" in the post-Kwangju period. As any open, 
nationwide labor organization was an easy target for state crackdown, intellectuals 
were reluctant to create yet another labor organization that would be exposed to the 
regime's security agencies. Given the severe suppression, the proponents of fieldwork 
believed that organizing small groups of workers was the most appropriate strategy 
and that it be carried out by people who were grounded in factories (Ch?ng 1988, 
186). 
South Korea's draconian labor law contributed inadvertently to the rise of field 
work proponents as well. The labor law of 1980 contained an infamous clause pro 
hibiting "third-party intervention." This law made it illegal for a local union to receive 
assistance from its industrial union or the FKTU with regard to bargaining. Although 
local unions were still required to belong to an industrial federation and the FKTU, 
each local was on its own, and bargaining was possible only between the company 
and the plant union. This measure made collective bargaining "even more of a sham 
than it had been under Park" and led to complete control over the union by the 
company and police (Ogle 1990, 113). For anyone wishing to participate in labor 
negotiations, the only way was to become one of the workers. 
The early 1980s were also a time when South Korean intellectuals were hit by a 
wave of socialism, the "great ideology that has swept the twentieth century" (An 
1989, 11). Socialism was certainly not new in Korea?its history goes back to the 
colonial period?but the division of Korea into two halves and the internecine war 
8In an autobiographical novel by a former student/labor activist, the tendency that I just 
described reaches an absurd point: The student/labor activist protagonist is waging a one-man 
campaign to get his job back after he was unjustly fired. After months of protesting in front 
of the factory gate, he is approached cautiously by two female fellow workers, who turn out 
to be student/labor activists from a different university. He also learns that there are two more 
student/labor activists in the same factory; none had dared to support him for fear of exposure 
(An 1989, 98-99). 
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had made socialism, along with communism, South Korea's nemesis (see Lee 2002a). 
The intellectuals' enchantment with socialism in the 1980s also coincided with their 
disenchantment with Western liberal democracy. The democratization movement at 
tributed its failure to stop the Yushin regime in the 1970s and the reemergence of 
the military dictatorship in 1980 partly to the uncritical application of western liberal 
democratic ideas to South Korea. 
None of the above-mentioned factors would have mattered much, however, if the 
lives of the working class had improved significantly over the years. Even well into 
the mid-1980s, the lives of the majority of the South Korean working class evoked 
the Dickensian image of a "blighted patch of humanity": "murderous" low wages; 
harsh working conditions; crammed "chicken coop" housing; and the ever-present 
threat of being fired, maimed, or imprisoned. According to an FKTU report in May 
1985, the workers' fixed wages, averaged across all areas, reached only 44 percent of 
the minimum cost of living; even with overtime pay and bonuses, wages reached only 
54 percent of the minimum cost of living (Ch'oe 1986, 52).9 
During South Korea's rapid industrialization, the Korean workers' average work 
week was not only longer than that of the workers in industrialized countries such as 
the United States and Japan but was also longer than that of workers in other devel 
oping countries in Asia such as the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan (P. Kim 1984, 
176). The workers also faced extremely harsh and unsafe working conditions; each 
day workers were killed, maimed, and permanently disabled, largely due to the neg 
ligence of factory owners and managers (see, among others, So 1988).10 Those who 
were involved in union activities were branded as procommunists and subjected to 
various threats, employment termination, and imprisonment (see, among others, Ogle 
1990, 75-91). 
The bodily intervention of intellectuals into the discourse of labor by reposition 
ing themselves as workers was therefore an outcome of various sociohistorical forces 
as well as the undongkw?n's own political culture: the post-Kwangju minjung move 
ment's revolutionary push with its internal dynamics between obligation and privi 
lege, the preexisting theoretical debate that privileged working in factories over en 
gaging political issues, the labor laws that allowed intellectuals' participation in labor 
issues only as factory workers, and the intellectuals' predilection for socialist ideas. 
All these factors converged with the prevailing belief among intellectuals that the 
workers most deserved rectification of the unjust and unequal society. 
9South Korea's economic development was noted for its equality, meaning that economic 
growth improved income distribution among different social groups. According to Ho-Keun 
Song (1991c), an assessment based on the official statistics hides more than it reveals, as income 
data are not reliable. South Korea's statistics on income are comparatively abundant and useful, 
but they only contain regular incomes after tax, ignoring unearned income, which is a practical 
source of the luxurious life for the upper class. The importance of unearned income multiplies 
particularly when rapid economic growth offers enormous opportunities for capital gains 
through speculation in housing and land. When land ownership and financial assets are con 
sidered in the measure of inequality, the story is radically different than official statistics 
suggest. 
10In 1986 alone, 142,088 workers were injured during work; of these, 1,660 died, 21,923 
became disabled, and 1,637 suffered from work-related chronic illnesses. The total amount of 
industrial damage reached one trillion won in 1986, a 10 percent increase from the previous 
year. The actual number of injured workers and the amount of monetary damage are probably 
much higher, since the government statistics do not include small factories with fewer than 
four employees or factories that do not carry industrial accident insurance. In addition, seamen, 
Korean employees of the U.S. Eighth Army, and construction workers employed in foreign 
countries were not included in the statistics (So 1988, 257). 
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The Sociology of "Disguised Employment" 
In the 1970s and until the early 1980s, an undongkw?n's decision to go to a 
factory was made individually, without organizational support or any practical guid 
ance. The number of undongkwon in factories was small, perhaps less than one hun 
dred altogether, and individuals were scattered throughout the country, unlike in the 
1980s. While students and the graduates of elite universities might have had some 
personal networks in factories, as some of their seniors and classmates were already in 
factories, those from less well-known schools with little or no activist background 
could rely only on their own sense of historical responsibility.11 It was not until around 
1984 that a would-be student/worker would have some written guidelines for activism 
in factories. 
In the immediate post-Kwangju era, activism in factories was the only logical 
path to follow for the most committed undongkwon. As one former student/worker 
activist recollects in his autobiographical novel, "every activist prioritized the labor 
movement [and] factory work became the barometer of one's commitment to the 
movement" (An 1989, 1-2). Starting in the mid-1980s, due partly to the govern 
ment's liberalization policy and partly to the concomitant growth of the min jung 
movement, the number of undongkwon increased, and many more paths besides the 
factory opened up for them. By becoming a professional such as a teacher, journalist, 
or staff member for a legal organization, one could still retain privileges and contribute 
to a white-collar labor movement. These "choices" notwithstanding, the immense 
force of obligation, that the prerequisite for being a truly committed undongkwon 
was to give up all privileges, was still very prevalent throughout the 1980s. 
Although by the mid-1980s working in factories had become ritualized and even 
privileged among the undongkwon, the actual process of transplanting oneself into a 
factory involved more than a sense of historical responsibility and individual deter 
mination. In order to crack down on disguised workers, the Ministry of Labor in 1984 
directed management to screen the educational, social, and family background, as well 
as the employment history of prospective employees. This measure forced the univer 
sity graduate or student to acquire an assumed identity, forging official documents 
and reconstructing life stories to fit those of a worker. Many were immediately sus 
pected and weeded out before they set foot in a factory. Once arrested, they were 
charged with criminal offenses, as was the case with Kw?n In-suk. 
Perhaps a more daunting task than the logistical difficulties of obtaining a coun 
terfeit identification card was the confrontation with parents, either during the de 
cision or after having been found working in a factory. The undongkw?n's parents' 
generation had collectively shared the historical experience of the Japanese colonial 
occupation, three years of bloody civil war, and rapid industrialization; their high 
hopes and determination for their children's material success and well-being thus took 
on a particular vengeance. Given the unwavering and collective push in South Korea 
for material success and status elevation, a son or daughter as a factory worker could 
only be a slap in the face, a disgrace to the family name, and possibly a sign of the 
parents' own moral failure. Students' personal letters and essays as well as court doc 
nPrior to the mid-1980s, ideological influences within the student movement were gen 
erated mostly through underground circles, which had existed more in elite universities and 
those with a strong tradition of student movements than in others. One former student activist 
claimed that one can trace the labor movement's differing ideological leanings to various 
underground circles in universities (An Chae-hwan, interview, March 17, 1993). 
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uments attest to the unrelenting dilemma between their desire to fulfill their parents' 
wishes and their sense of responsibility to continue their activism. One male student 
agonized over his parents' objection to his working in a factory. His father threatened 
to break his leg if he dared, and his mother did not intervene but was always watchful 
and worried: 
"My mother would worry about whether I was safe, whether I got injured, 
whether I ate regularly, or whether I was healthy. My heart feels so heavy. I have to 
overcome this loneliness, overcome the web of affection and sentimental feelings" 
(KSCF 1984c, 97). 
Throughout the 1970s and until the early 1980s, the social categories of worker 
and intellectual were more in flux and not as clear cut as they would become later. 
South Korea's rapid industrialization and its concomitant massive urban migration 
resulted in a large number of university students hailing from socioeconomically 
disadvantaged backgrounds. As education became the sole source for upward mobility 
for most South Koreans, one's university education was attained at the great sacrifice 
of family members. Many university students had parents and younger (mostly female) 
siblings working in factories to finance their education. So while the previously men 
tioned Kim Mun-su's decision to become a factory worker in the early 1970s was a 
circuitous one, he was not unfamiliar with factory work, as his sister was a factory 
worker. His poor family did not own a radio until he was in high school. Pak Tong, 
a Korea University student in the early 1980s, did not have a decent pair of shoes 
throughout his high-school years, and his father was a day laborer (interview, February 
12-13, 1993). 
Starting in the mid-1980s, however, with South Korea's rapid industrialization, 
more and more university students came from the homes of South Korea's first post 
colonial middle-class generation. Their childhoods were spent in relative wealth and 
comfort. Kw?n In-suk, class of 1987, came from a solid middle-class background; her 
father was a government official, and her goal had been to pursue doctoral studies in 
France. Neither Kim Mun-su in the 1970s nor Pak Tong in the early 1980s would 
have dreamed of studying abroad, as it was reserved only for the truly privileged. 
In the 1970s, "disguised employment" (wijang ch'wiop) required a tremendous 
sense of determination, will, and resourcefulness. The previously mentioned labor 
activist Yi T'ae-bok began as a day laborer in Yongsan, Seoul, and spent the first few 
years exploring labor conditions in industrial complexes throughout the country. He 
attempted to "infiltrate" the FKTU with the hope of reforming it from within, only 
to be thwarted by someone who recognized him as a former student activist (T. Yi 
1994, 266-67). 
Kim Mun-su's decision to dedicate his life to labor was tortuous and laborious. 
He had spent his first summer vacation in college making dresses in a sweatshop 
which stood in the middle of a vegetable field on the outskirts of Seoul. No application 
or resume was required to get a factory job then. As Kim pedaled the sewing machine, 
however, he began to doubt his decision: "I began to question whether or not I could 
last like this for the rest of my life. I was used to being poor, but I didn't think I had 
to live like this. My friends and I talked about the need for organizing workers, but 
I didn't think I had to be the one to do it" (1986, 134). His final resolve to commit 
himself to the labor movement a few years later took him to another sweatshop where 
he made buttonholes for men's shirts. He was twenty-two years old?and a former 
student at a prestigious university?and slow, for which a much younger co-worker 
constantly rebuked him. After stints at three different sweatshops, he obtained a 
license as a boiler mechanic in 1975 (138?40). 
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From the mid-1980s on, however, entering into work at factories was no longer 
an act of individual determination. The process became more collective, with a ritu 
alized and routinized element that suggested that it was not always an invitation to 
a life-changing experience. Most disguised workers were concentrated in the Ky?ng 
gido-Inch on area, which had the highest concentration of small-sized factories and a 
high concentration of workers; about half of all manufacturing workers in South Korea 
resided in this area. The area was also known for high job turnover. Little skill was 
required for jobs, and the security screening of applicants was less thorough than in 
areas with large factories. Ky?nggido-Inch'?n was also close to Seoul, which was the 
center of the democratization movement. Would-be workers found it easy to blend 
in and to find like-minded fellow undongkw?n. In the mid-1980s, when a female 
university student went to work in a small electronics factory with 140 employees in 
Inch on, for example, she discovered that there were at least ten student/worker 
activists in that factory alone (S. Kim 1997, 135). 
The Discourse of Moral Privilege 
The intellectuals' migration into factories was grounded in a fundamental shift 
in the visions and goals of the minjung movement, and the story of this migration 
was accompanied by fundamental shifts in their understanding of capitalism and 
modernization. Sociologist Jeffrey Alexander argues that intellectuals in the West 
developed a new explanatory theory to represent the shifting sociopolitical world order 
in the 1960s; their new narrative of modernity, modernization, and capitalist devel 
opment inverted the signs and symbols previously associated with these notions (1995, 
66-78). 
As South Korea's overall state policy and practice implicitly conferred the status 
of luxury to the notions of democracy and equitable justice, the intellectuals' shift of 
the social narrative involved inverting the state's goals and ideals. Capitalist devel 
opment, in its production of great wealth and great poverty, was viewed as the source 
of dehumanization, individualization, fragmentation, and alienation, instead of lib 
eration. This inversion of economic ideals carried into the overall vision of the de 
mocratization movement. Socialism, or some sort of socialism, became the ultimate 
symbol of the good that would provide wealth, equality, and a restored community. 
Intellectuals also inverted the received societal representation of workers. Work 
ers, who had previously been disdained by society as kongsuni and kongdori (derogatory 
terms denoting "factory girls" and "factory boys") without their own class conscious 
ness or subjectivity, were seen as having acquired class consciousness and subjectivity 
through their resistance to exploitation and oppression in the workplace and in society 
at large. Their resistance also became a legitimate basis for their place in society as a 
significant economic and political actor. 
At the same time, however, the narrative of the intellectuals' commitment to 
labor took on what I characterize as the "discourse of moral privilege," which relied 
on the traditional role of intellectuals as educated and therefore morally upright and 
socially responsible (for a fuller treatment of this topic, see Lee 2002b). Students and 
intellectuals were bequeathed a rich tradition of social criticism; during the Chos?n 
period (1392-1910), the students at the National Academy and also local public 
schools 
"routinely engaged in protest acts or voiced their opinions through joint 
memorials" (Haboush 1994, 387). Of particular relevance is the Confucian concept 
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of knowledge, central to political power and prestige in traditional society, which 
dictated that knowledge be employed not only to enhance one's social position but 
also to maintain the proper and stable order of society, "rectifying it if gone astray 
and restoring it if in disarray" (Kwok 1994, 19). Even as intellectuals sought to 
envision a fundamental shift from the existing epistemic and sociopolitical order, their 
claim to be the voice and the true representative of the people rested in this largely 
Confucian concept of knowledge. 
The discourse of moral privilege was of course not unique to the South Korean 
social movement; from the 1960s' New Left in the West to Tiananmen in China, 
social protest represented a moral critique of society and was framed in terms of moral 
righteousness (see, for example, Levitt 1979; Perry 1992, 152). But in South Korea, 
the discourse was injected with urgency and potency by what was perceived to be the 
distinctive historical experience of modern Korea: its colonial past and the divided 
state. As contemporary social problems were understood to have been derived from 
uncorrected historical wrongs, such as the colonial legacy and the continuing con 
frontation between North and South Korea, the suggested resolution was to rectify 
the wronged history. Also, because of state repression, intellectuals could not openly 
support socialism. The intellectuals' discourse of moral privilege had deep historical 
roots and was also an effective strategy for the "public transcript," given the state's 
repression and its own emphasis on nationalism (for details, see Lee 2002a). 
The students and intellectuals' court testimonies, statements of appeals, and let 
ters throughout the 1980s testify to the prevalent discourse of moral privilege. For 
example, the following is a court testimony of No Suk-y?ng, a female student on trial 
for working illegally in a factory and "possessing socialist thoughts": "No one can 
avoid the responsibility for our society's problems. Especially those with higher edu 
cation and social conscience need to volunteer to create a new ethical and moral social 
order. For this simple reason, I went to work in a factory. I had no self-conceit or 
arrogance. My only desire was to contribute to the society that I have benefited from 
by living a productive life [dictated by] my conscience and reason" (1982, 3). 
Revolution and the Discourse of Moral Privilege 
The narrative of moral privilege became even more prevalent in the mid-1980s, 
at a time when the democratization movement as a whole was working out a "sci 
entific" path to its "revolutionary" goals and when socialist ideas began to dominate 
the movement. Even for those involved in S?nory?n (Alliance of Labor Movements in 
the Seoul Area), which was inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideas and principles, rhetor 
ical constructions and language operated in terms of morality. S?nory?n members 
were accused of engaging in antistate activities and were tried for violating the Na 
tional Security Law. During the court testimony, the majority of S?nory?n members 
narrated their involvement in labor as expressing their sense of responsibility as the 
privileged and their desire to share the life of workers, which they considered more 
authentic than their own. 
Yun Hy?n-suk had been teaching at a performing-arts school since 1980. Her 
students were from largely upper-middle-class backgrounds and were brought to 
school in chauffeured cars. Disillusioned with teaching, she went to work in a factory. 
Her first job was at a small factory with ten employees. She worked from 8:00 a.m. 
until 9:00 p.m., often sustaining herself on diluted yogurt and pieces of 100 won 
pastry. She saw some fellow workers saving the pastries to give to their siblings at 
home. She had to quit her first job due to an injury but found another garment factory 
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job soon thereafter. The starting daily wage at the new factory was 2,280 won, which 
would have been about $2.56; without overtime, a monthly wage would have been 
between 70,000 and 80,000 won, which was hardly enough to make a living. When 
charged with instigating a rally for increased wages at the factory, Yun declared: "I 
accept the charge. Who would not instigate the struggle, given this reality?" (S?no 
ry?n n.d., 109). 
Yu Si-chu had also been a teacher prior to joining S?nory?n. Her first teacher's 
paycheck of three hundred thousand won felt like the "workers' sweat and blood." 
Working in a factory was a way of doing away with her own "life of complicity and 
cowardice" (S?nory?n n.d., 110). Another S?nory?n member, Yu In-he, believed that 
factory experience was necessary in order to live "a rightful life." When a wrist injury 
forced her to quit her factory job, she established a night school with the workers 
whom she had befriended at the factory (S?nory?n n.d., 108). 
Ch'oe Han-bae's case was unusual among S?nory?n members in that he became 
involved in labor after having had a white-collar job. With a bachelor's degree in 
business management, Ch'oe had worked in the marketing department of a large 
corporation and had been conducting marketing research in the sweatshop district of 
the Ch'?nggye area. He was very impressed with the workers who remained dignified 
in spite of "hell-like working conditions." Especially impressive for him was the fierce 
spirit of the Ch'?nggye Textile Union (Ch'?nggye pibok nojo) workers, which changed 
his life course. Not knowing how to go about getting involved in labor, he started as 
a handyman on a construction site and later acquired a license as a boiler technician. 
After stints at a paper mill and an electronics manufacturer, he found a job at Daewoo 
Apparel (S?nory?n n.d., 113-14). 
The discourse of moral privilege also provided eloquent witness to the workers' 
low wages and harsh working conditions. Kw?n In-suk's moving testimony of her 
own brief experience as a factory worker is emblematic of this genre: 
The daily wage was twenty-nine hundred won. ... If there was no overtime, the 
entire monthly wage of sixty thousand to seventy thousand won would easily be spent 
on the younger brother's tuition, the father's medicine. . . . This forces workers to 
work until ten at night. With the conveyor that never stops, there is already work 
piled up if one gets up even once to straighten one's back [and] the never-ending 
verbal abuse of the foreman. . . . [W]here there is no meaningful conversation between 
[the workers], when one nineteen-year-old fellow worker said to me, "Onni [big 
sister], it is hard work, isn't it," I cried in gratitude. 
(1987, 177-78) 
The Insidious Logic of Representation 
Bifurcation of the Intellectual and the Worker 
Although the intellectuals' desire to fuse with workers was sincere, genuine, and 
even heroic, plunging oneself into the life of a worker had also become a sort of deus 
ex machina by which all tensions and problems of the undongkw?n were resolved. 
More important, intellectuals' relations with workers remained tenuous and even 
problematic; that is, their discourse of moral and ethical privilege was embedded in 
an a priori conceptual bifurcation of intellectual and worker. The epistemological 
logic of the intellectuals' representation of themselves as socially conscious and re 
sponsible hinged on the workers as the object and beneficiary of their act of conscience. 
This content downloaded from 128.97.27.20 on Sat, 18 Jul 2015 00:12:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REPRESENTING THE WORKER 925 
This problematic, embedded to some extent in any representation?and with 
abundant precedent in other countries (see, among others, Brown 1974)?manifested 
itself at two levels in the mid-1980s in South Korea. At one level, students and 
intellectuals unwittingly objectified and in some cases apotheosized workers, subsum 
ing workers' individual identities under the identity of the working class and putting 
them into an easily transparent category. The tendency to put workers in a category 
disempowered workers, as they became the object of the intellectuals' competing 
debates and mobilizations. 
The following case encapsulates the discursive working of the intellectuals' ob 
jectification of workers. In 1984 the Korea Student Christian Federation (KSCF) 
(Han'guk kidok haksaeng ch'ong y?nmaeng)12 published an extensive manual for 
would-be-workers entitled "Guidelines for Factory Activism" ("Kongjang hwaldong 
annaes?"). The purpose of this manual was to approach the reality of minjung objec 
tively, to "overcome the prevalent tendency to objectify minjung as an abstract form." 
The publication is comprehensive and admirably detailed: it discusses the "correct 
attitude" for a prospective student/labor activist, offers a long list of prerequisite 
readings before finding a job, suggests topics for conversation with workers, offers a 
list of skills helpful in getting jobs (including instructions on how to fabricate one's 
background), and explains how to calculate wages and how to quit. The following is 
on how to befriend co-workers: 
Hobbies that take money and time are not appropriate for workers. Find out what 
you can do together with co-workers [that does not cost money] such as hiking, ko 
[Korean chess], and chess. If you can sing pop songs soulfully, play guitar, repair a 
tape recorder, or give acupressure, you can gain popularity. Good handwriting can 
be particularly useful in various ways. 
1. In order to befriend co-workers, one has to invest lots of time and have a reservoir 
of conversation topics ready. When getting to know someone for the first time, 
accompany him or her wherever he or she goes (such as on walks; shopping; and 
going to stores, taverns, and pool halls). 
2. Do not slacken while working; don't complain about hard work (lest you be seen 
as 
making a fuss). However, it is not good to be seen as a workaholic either. One 
can 
always learn how workers talk and what they do for leisure by observing. Let's 
learn by imitating. 
3. Keep up your spirits in the factory (it is all right for women to be talkative); a 
man should be seen as considerate but of few words. Pay attention to your ex 
pressions and choice of language. At first, ask simple questions to learn their 
language and their way of speaking, then gradually lead the conversation to a 
more 
sophisticated level. 
4. Be attentive to your clothes, choice of food, hobbies, and so on, so that you are 
not 
noticeably different but also do not give the sense that you are hiding some 
thing. 
(KSCF 1984c, 1-3) 
While the manual shows the extent to which the intellectuals labored to acquire 
intimate knowledge of workers, it also captures the moment when what J. Ranci?re 
calls the "insidious logic of representation" plays out most innocently and disturb 
ingly: the worker becomes all-knowable, categorizable, and most of all transparent. 
12Despite its name, the KSCF is actually an organization composed of youth, university 
students, and university graduates, and its leadership is usually in their late twenties or thirties. 
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There is a presumed worker's identity, culture, attitude, and value system that orders 
the worker's daily life differently than that of the intellectual. More to the point, this 
objectifying conferred upon the intellectuals the authority to represent workers and 
to articulate the ideology of workers as their own, much as the French intellectuals 
in nineteenth-century France described by Ranci?re (1989, xviii). 
If the KSCF manual presumed a difference between the intellectual and the worker 
at the conceptual level, this difference is inscribed on their bodies as well. A female 
activist on trial for instigating a wage-increase dispute urged the presiding judges 
and prosecutors to "go out on a sunny day around five or six in the evening near Ewha 
Women's College and the Kuro Industrial Complex and compare college students 
and workers. The students are shiny, vivacious, and pretty, whereas the workers are 
pale and short, with big feet?since they work sitting down all day long" (S?nory?n 
n.d., 111). 
This bodily bifurcation was not merely rhetorical; it was also immediately rec 
ognized as a given and accepted by society at large. Undongkwon students and in 
tellectuals often invoked this familiar representation of workers to highlight both the 
plight of workers and their own dedication to erasing the division between the workers 
and themselves. In the mid-1980s, collections of writings on the students' experiences 
of working in factories would often bear titles such as "Rough Hands Are Beautiful" 
("K?ch'in soni ar?mdapda") (see, for example, KSCF 1984b). 
The problem was that the intellectuals' efforts to shift their social category from 
intellectual to worker was meaningful and effective only when the bifurcation?con 
ceptual as well as actual?of the intellectual and the worker was recognized and 
validated by society at large. The intellectuals' moral discourse relied on and sustained 
this bifurcation, however unwittingly. The undongkw?n's true dilemma was that 
without the binary set up between the intellectuals and the workers, their discourse 
of privilege had little social and political efficacy. 
The problem of objectifying and "otherizing" workers was noticed and acknowl 
edged by the undongkwon themselves. In fact, activists raised these issues more 
straightforwardly than the above instructions on how to befriend workers would sug 
gest. In another manual prepared by the same group, for example, soon-to-be workers 
are warned of the potential problems that they would create in their relations with 
co-workers. These included the tendency to put forth theoretical positions over prac 
tical considerations, to view workers as objects of pity, to think of labor activism as 
the sole barometer of one's commitment to the movement ("if she cannot survive in 
the labor movement, she lacks basic qualifications as an activist"), and of what was 
called 
"pietism," showing off to fellow activists how well one is adapting to the ascetic 
life of a worker (KSCF 1987, 18?20). The would-be-workers are also told: "Many of 
you think of workers as simple and lofty individuals, without greed and egotistical 
individualism, but the reality is different; workers are realistic, giving in to the rules 
of capitalistic society" (KSCF 1987, 12). 
Indeed, the workers whom the undongkwon met on factory floors refused to live 
up to the stock image of the working class carrying on a class mission. A former 
student/worker activist tells of her encounter with a female worker who, unaware of 
her university background, teased her for her "carelessness about appearance": "Things 
started getting interesting; one fellow worker chided me for an hour to put on makeup 
and wear skirts and told me that [my negligence about my appearance] was because 
I was lazy. ... It is difficult being a worker" (KSCF 1984c, 120). 
If the "insidious logic of representation" operated at the level where intellectuals 
objectified workers, then in everyday practice it operated as workers became the object 
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of intellectuals' conflicting aspirations: the Gramscian aspiration for an organic fusion 
with the workers versus the Leninist one to lead them. The 1980s' democratization 
movement's lexicon produced various terms that pointed to the complex ways in which 
these desires were expressed. Intellectuals' "infatuation with struggles," their emphasis 
on 
"political struggle," and their "ideological struggles" were often-used phrases. In 
tellectuals were anxious to engage in whatever form of struggle that they saw fit as 
soon as they set foot in a factory, to lead a protest into "political" struggle, and to 
justify such an act on ideological grounds. Once, a student/worker activist organized 
a strike only six months into his job at a factory, without organizing a union first (Yi 
Tong-su, interview, February 14, 1993). 
Bifurcation, "Political Struggle," and S?nory?n 
The intellectuals' emphasis on political struggle often led workers to more radical 
forms of protest regardless of the issue at hand: street demonstrations, sit-ins, and the 
occupation of factories. The workers who associated with intellectual/labor activists 
were dismissed, often even before they engaged in any activities, such as union or 
ganizing, study groups, or street demonstrations. Unable to find other jobs due to 
the circulation of blacklists and unable to sustain their movement activities due to 
their exposure to management and state surveillance, the workers found that their 
proletarian consciousness and revolutionary vision, acquired initially (in many cases) 
through the urging of the intellectuals, often led them to the path of the lumpen 
proletariat (see Ch?ng 1988; Pak 1991). 
This tendency was most pronounced in the 1986 "wage-increase struggle." Wage 
increase negotiations take place in May of every year, and until 1985 or so collective 
bargaining and signing contracts were perfunctorily performed between union and 
management. In early 1986, a consensus was reached within the labor movement that 
its annual negotiations would be conducted in a unified manner, with its demands 
not limited only to bread-and-butter issues but also addressing political reforms (Ch'oe 
1986, 60?69). An attempt to organize a regionwide committee to lead and guide 
unified regional activities to obtain wage increases across enterprises failed, however. 
Eventually two separate groups were formed, with no significant differences between 
them (Ch?ng 1988, 198-99). 
Both groups saw the upcoming negotiation as providing the labor movement 
with momentum for a higher level of struggle, owing to the workers' heightened 
political consciousness. They also agreed that their wage-increase campaign should 
aspire to be like the Kuro Industrial Complex Solidarity Strike of 1985 (for a detailed 
analysis of this strike, see Koo 2001, 111?25). The Kuro strike was a model of 
solidarity not only among workers crossing the barriers of individual plants and re 
gions but also among dissident and student groups. It was also considered a "political 
struggle" par excellence, as political repression of the democratic union movement, 
rather than economic grievances, triggered the strike in the first place. The 1986 
campaign was a woeful failure, however, accomplishing even less than what had been 
achieved in 1985. Suppression by the state and management was only one reason for 
the dismal performance. Much blame went to organizations such as S?nory?n, which 
had pushed for "political struggle" (Ch?ng 1988, 198-99). 
S?nory?n, which was organized in August 1985, represented a new breed of labor 
activism in South Korea. S?nory?n openly defined itself as a revolutionary organiza 
tion?a revolutionary act in itself in the sociopolitical context of South Korea at the 
time. S?nory?n was critical of the prevailing perspective among activists that workers 
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acquire their political consciousness gradually and attributed the failure of the 1970s' 
labor movement to "trade unionism." 
"Trade unionism" here refers to achieving the improvement of working conditions 
and higher wages as the final and ultimate goal of the labor movement as a whole. 
Lenin was perhaps the most vocal critic of trade unionism, arguing that a "sponta 
neous" 
working-class movement could not on its own develop more than a trade union 
consciousness: "'[T]he "spontaneous element" represents nothing more nor less than 
consciousness in an embryonic form' and 
... a 
revolutionary consciousness would have 
to be brought to the workers from without for them to overcome their ideological 
enslavement by the bourgeoisie" (1902, 30-31; quoted in Fantasia 1988, 237). As an 
aspiring Leninist organization, S?nory?n guided and supported various workers' "po 
litical struggles" to develop revolutionary consciousness, openly carrying out political 
agitation among workers through its publication Sonoryon Gazette and through orga 
nizing workers in underground small groups. 
"Political struggle" refers to tackling all sociopolitical issues that affect the work 
ers' lives directly or indirectly rather than concentrating on issues traditionally defined 
as belonging to the working class such as wages, working conditions, and the right 
to unionize. In South Korea's sociopolitical context at the time, political struggle 
would have meant engaging virtually all issues of society: from import liberalization 
to reunification and nuclear proliferation. Sonoryon was the first labor organization to 
announce its official position on the presidential direct election debate in 1985 and 
on the campaign to abolish the National Security Law, issues that were not tradition 
ally in the domain of the labor movement (see Ch?ng 1988, 197; Pak 1991, 88-92). 
S?nory?n's place within the democratization movement was a highly contested 
and contentious one, but the organization inspired much awe among the undongkw?n 
(and society at large, as its leaders later became well-publicized fugitives) for its 
members' reputed Leninesque discipline, dedication, and revolutionary lifestyle. 
(Sonoryon also inspired the literary imagination of former student/labor activists who 
produced much of the "labor literature" of the late 1980s and early 1990s.) The main 
force behind the rise of Sonoryon was intellectuals, such as the previously mentioned 
Kim Mun-su. 
In summary, the following reasons were offered within the labor movement to 
explain the failure of the 1986 wage-increase negotiations (see Ch?ng 1988; Pak 
1991). First, the leaders of the negotiations, many of whom were intellectual/worker 
activists, were "obsessed" with their role as leaders, often resorting to taking action 
without first analyzing the demands or the general situation of the workers. Second, 
most activists were concerned more with immediate results than with the process of 
workers coming to their own empowerment through their gradual and self-motivated 
participation. Finally, most activists tried to veer wage-increase negotiations toward 
political struggles. 
In other words, intellectual/worker activists were too busy starting fights with 
management without first making it possible for the workers to engage in the fight 
themselves. Often the activists' demands to management were incongruous, given the 
workers' immediate and pressing needs. They also carried out more militant tactics 
such as the occupation of factories and sit-ins, accompanying their demands for wage 
increases with slogans such as "down with the military regime" (Pak 1991, 86?87). 
Some workers, who were initially very active in the wage-increase struggle rejected 
the more militant political demands put forth by the activists (Ch?ng 1988, 200). 
The lack of support by the rank and file for such measures left leaders without pro 
tection. Many of the labor disputes of 1986 failed in spite of numerous strikes and 
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sit-ins, resulting in the dismissal and the imprisonment of numerous workers. All 
these pointed to the impatience of activists, their interest in seeking the immediate 
fruits of their organizing efforts at the expense of long-term gains for the workers, 
and their inattentiveness to the workers' everyday issues. The main cause of all these 
was believed to have been rooted in the intellectuals' general tendency to think of 
workers as objects of their agitation and mobilization rather than to see them as agents 
of their own movement.13 
"Ideological Struggles" 
The 
"political struggle" that was at the center of the 1986 wage-increase campaign 
was part and parcel of the "ideological struggle" {inyom t'ujaneg) that became one of 
the hallmarks of the 1980s' movement. Inspired by and modeled after Lenin's What 
Is To Be Done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement, "ideological struggles" were osten 
sibly debates on the comprehensive issues of political theories, organizational theories, 
strategies, and tactics of the democratization movement. In reality, however, the de 
bates were largely between two main groups who disagreed over how closely to follow 
orthodox Marxism-Leninism. 
These mostly sectarian, divisive, and debilitating debates consumed much intel 
lectual energy of the 1980s and caused a great deal of anguish and pain for those 
involved. Whatever merits that the long and exhaustive debates might have had for 
the labor movement were often outweighed by their extreme pedantry and enmity. 
Numerous groups and underground circles gathered and scattered along ideological 
divisions. Workers often felt squeezed between the warring groups. The experience 
of one former S?nory?n member and seamstress, Kim Mi-yong, is emblematic. 
In her memoir, Kim recalls the evening when she presided over a public rally to 
launch a nationwide workers' organization. The idea of a national organization was 
conceived by the upper echelon of S?nory?n leadership and had generated heated 
debates among various groups in the labor movement. Many of these groups saw the 
plan as S?nory?n's attempt to gain hegemony within the labor movement. Unaware 
of this prevalent sentiment, Kim had worked hard to prepare for the rally, even 
rehearsing answers for questions that might be raised from the floor. Her speech ("Let's 
build a nationwide workers' organization and build a world where the workers become 
owners of society!") was greeted with cynical remarks and a barrage of questions from 
activists representing various ideological orientations. As Kim stood on the podium 
with hundreds of people staring at her, it occurred to her for the first time that she 
had not the slightest idea how to build such a world, much less what it meant to her. 
She confidently shouted the slogan but had not probed into its meaning?that she 
had been yearning for such a world and the fact that the other people who shared the 
same vision had proposed it was sufficient ground for her to proclaim it publicly 
(1991, 144-46). 
Meanwhile, members from other organizations leaped to the podium and led the 
audience to the streets with their own slogans. What troubled Kim was not only the 
organized disruption from other organizations at the rally, however, but also the 
13Another scholar, Seung-kyung Kim, notes that the student activists also considered the 
workers' acceptance of a meager improvement in their tangible rewards as "false consciousness": 
"Student activists aimed at leading workers to a higher level of understanding of their social 
location and sometimes regarded the improvements in workers' lives as hindering their progress 
towards achieving class consciousness" (1997, 142). 
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increasing gap within Sonoryon between the intellectuals who composed the leader 
ship and the ordinary workers such as herself. For example, Kim was asked by Sono 
ryon leaders to draft the workers' position on the abolition of the National Security 
Law and the 1986 Asian Games. She had spent many nights working on the draft, 
only to have it returned with instructions for revisions that she believed were beyond 
her capacity. She was discouraged and confused and felt ignorant (1991, 147). 
Soon after the rally, an underground pamphlet circulated within Sonoryon criti 
cizing its activities as "bowing to spontaneity," a phrase from Lenin's What Is To Be 
Done? (I969, 41). Its meaning remained elusive to Kim Mi-yong, which also made 
her feel that all her activities so far could have been characterized as 
"bowing to 
spontaneity." Kim soon found that those who agreed with this type of criticism were 
leaving Sonoryon, and it eventually dissolved soon after (152). 
The 
"political struggle" and "ideological struggle" of Sonoryon point to the wide 
spread tendency of the intellectuals to inculcate in the workers a "correct" vision for 
the future, which, as sociologist Song Ho-k?n suggests, might have caused intellec 
tuals to settle too readily into the role of the worker. Consequently the intellectuals 
eschewed the need for a critical tension mediating their relationship with the workers. 
Being a worker provided a sense of security and comfort at the expense of interrogating 
and reflecting on ones' own motives and position (1991b, 1267). Moreover, the po 
litical efficacy of the alliance relied on the intellectuals' preserving their position as 
authoritative and knowledgeable. There is no denying that the alliance was predicated 
on and in some ways reified the division between intellectual and worker. 
Representation and Historical Accountability 
Although my account of the intellectuals in the alliance may be rather critical, 
it is not to undermine or discount their crucial contribution to the labor movement 
and the social movement at large. In fact, a brief discussion of the 1987 labor move 
ment points to the dispersed and multiple ways that the undongkw?n played their 
roles in historical moments. Soon after the ruling party leader promised in June 1987 
to bring political reform, the South Korean workers rushed into the streets in pro 
test?the largest such labor protest since 1945. In the aftermath of the 1987 "Great 
Labor Offensive," South Korean labor had experienced the most militant and successful 
labor activism of the four "Asian tigers" (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong)?pushing pay increases to double digits since 1987 and organizing two thou 
sand new unions in 1988 (see Koo 2001, 153?217). 
Most of the literature and social commentary on the Great Offensive suggests 
that the undongkw?n had no place in the dramatic events of the summer of 1987. 
Intellectual/worker activists by then either had left the factories or were concentrated 
in the Kyonggido-Inch on area, far from the southeast region where the most militant 
protest took place. The volcanic eruption of the workers was indeed unanticipated by 
many undongkw?n, who watched the unfolding scene with a sense of bewilderment? 
and in some cases skepticism?along with the rest of society. 
A recent study suggests, however, that the offensive cannot be adequately con 
sidered outside the context of the continuous and vociferous rise of discourse of labor 
in the 1980s in which intellectuals were a constitutive part. The intellectuals' partic 
ipation in the labor movement facilitated bringing the issue of labor into the public 
domain, "shifting social resources" at a time when the democratization movement as 
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a whole privileged the issue of political reform over the issue of labor. More specifi 
cally, many of the workers who emerged as leaders during and after the offensive had 
connections to the undongkw?n through either underground study groups or personal 
networks that were in place before the massive mobilization in 1987 (see Koo 2001, 
153?87). Also, many of the intellectual/worker activists returned to the site of labor 
after 1987 as leaders and staff members of labor organizations that were created in 
the aftermath of 1987, such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (Minju 
noch'ong), or as researchers in labor institutes.14 
The changed landscape of the South Korean social movement in the 1990s, how 
ever, tempers a hasty celebration of the intellectuals' historical role in the labor move 
ment of the 1980s. Since the early 1990s, labor no longer occupies the privileged 
ontological place within social movements at large as it once did in the 1980s. Fur 
thermore, as I have argued elsewhere, the general paradigm shift from the "people" 
(minjung) to the "citizen" (simin) in the social movement shifted the terms of eman 
cipatory narrative from the "moral and ethical" to "that of articulating the issues 
largely on the basis of interest, as a right-bearing and right-claiming citizen" (2002b, 
156). Labor particularly has had difficulties maintaining its hard-won rights and 
concessions due to sociopolitical changes beginning in 1990 as well as the financial 
crisis of 1997. In the 1990s, one would have been hard pressed to find a Kw?n In 
suk forging her identification card hoping to lead the workers into a revolution. Most 
undongkw?n in the alliance reverted back to their nonworker status, an option which 
few workers had. At the same time, the erstwhile experiences of undongkw?n are 
rapidly becoming commodity items in the domain of popular culture, ubiquitous in 
literary and dramatic representations of the 1980s as a bygone era imbued with the 
spirit of self-negation and collective goodwill, feeding the current sentiment of nos 
talgia and enervation. 
In the context of the democratization movement's demise and the consequent 
shifting intellectual paradigm, how does one engage responsibly with the 1980s' social 
movement so that one is able to explain both its potency and problematics, neither 
privileging essentialized notions of "history" and "people" nor dismissing pronounce 
ments that are not 
"theoretically sophisticated"? How might such a historical narrative 
facilitate the intellectuals of the alliance to reflect on their role in hailing the worker 
as a hero of the revolution?which eventually came only in the form of piecemeal 
reform measures?and rearticulate their locations and positionalities? With the pro 
jected visions and ideals of the 1980s unattained, how does one prevent the undong 
kw?n experience from becoming reduced to an object of nostalgia or commodification 
and instead enable us to reconceptualize social relations in an empowering and par 
ticipatory way? 
Compared to the largely deflated Western intellectual scene after 1968, the South 
Korean undongkw?n intellectuals' attempt to shift their social identity and mold the 
workers into revolutionaries is a countercurrent against the tide of postmodern doubts 
and uncertainties about progress, human emancipation, and class struggle (see, for 
example, Lyotard 1984). In the words of Michel Foucault in particular, any progressive 
political potential in the ideal of the autonomous subject was questioned, and the 
links between "consciousness, self-reflection and freedom" dissolved (Dews 1984, 87). 
14I do not just celebrate this phenomenon; in fact, a number of serious problems are related 
to the fact that the former intellectual/worker activists occupy positions of leadership in the 
current labor movement, one of which is that they bring forth their previous sectarian ten 
dencies to the issues at hand. 
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Furthermore, the intellectuals' efforts can be challenged as yet another type of political 
construction producing "particular historical forms of power, self-identity, exclusion, 
and subjection" (Mitchell and Abu-Lughod 1993, 79). In this context, intellectuals 
in the postcolonial nationalist movements and nation building in the third world have 
largely been viewed with suspicion for their less-than-emancipatory ways, as noted by 
Neil Lazarus (1994). In the case of the South Korean democratization movement, 
while the sacrifice and dedication of the undongkwon are recognized as catalyzing the 
democratic reforms of the late 1980s, nowadays their previous behavior in the move 
ment is being scrutinized more and more as undemocratic, hierarchical, and sexist, 
among other things (see, among others, Kwon 2000). 
To the implied proposition of abstinence from any sort of representation?since 
it is implicated with power?the scholars of the Subaltern Studies school have re 
sponded that it is yet again the voice of the privileged within the domain of the first 
world that is speaking, arguing that even after all the privileged positions are chal 
lenged with the spread of anticolonial movements, the Western industrial societies 
still enjoy "the epistemic privilege" (Chatterjee 1986, 17). Gayatri Spivak, developing 
this line of thinking, charged that the first-world intellectuals' concern for the politics 
of the oppressed can hide a privileged position of the intellectual (1988, 284?85). 
Feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff has elaborated on Spivak's points: "[Spivak] criti 
cizes the 
'self-abnegating intellectual' pose that Foucault and Deleuze adopt when 
they reject speaking for others on the grounds that it assumes the oppressed can 
transparently represent their own true interests. According to Spivak, Foucault and 
Deleuze's position serves only to conceal the actual authorizing power of the retreating 
intellectuals, who in their very retreat help to consolidate a particular conception of 
experience (as transparent and self-knowing)" (1991-92, 22-23). 
Alcoff finds a viable option in Spivak's suggestion of "speaking to" in which "the 
intellectual neither abnegates his or her discursive role nor presumes an authenticity of 
the oppressed but still allows for the possibility that the oppressed will produce a coun 
tersentence' that can then suggest a new historical narrative" (1991-92, 23). AlcofFs 
position is based on the premise that speaking for the other and speaking about the other 
are not so clearly demarcated. Speaking for others entails speaking about others; in ad 
dition, every form of representation, whether it is speaking for the other or speaking 
about the other, is a form of mediation and interpretation that has impacts on the other. 
Alcoff argues further that speaking for others, despite the epistemological prob 
lems, remains valid for certain situations: "An absolute retreat [from speaking] weak 
ens political effectivity, is based on a metaphysical illusion, and often effects only an 
obscuring of the intellectual's power" (1991-92, 24). She raises, along with the ne 
cessity of speaking, the important issue of accountability: "Speaking should always 
carry with it an accountability and responsibility for what one says" (25). This ac 
countability is closely connected to analyzing the impact of the speaking, "the prob 
able or actual effects of the words on the discursive and material context. . . . [0]ne 
must also look at where the speech goes and what it does there" (26). 
This notion of accountability is what leads me to reconsider the post-Foucauldian 
disavowal of representation. While the disavowal calls attention to the need for crit 
ically scrutinizing representation in general, a much-needed practice, it also dislodges 
the act of speaking for others from the Alcoffian notion of accountability by implying 
that all acts of speaking for others are "a discredited aspiration, and secretly author 
itarian" (Lazarus 1994, 204). If the undongkw?n's efforts in the alliance are dismissed 
as yet another politically suspicious act of third-world intellectuals' representation of 
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the people, predicated upon "a will to power" that is similar to the dominant state 
power, for example, this amounts not only to dismissing their historical role in the 
social movement but also to eschewing the need for continued engagement in the 
current era. 
The alliance between workers and intellectuals was a part of the evolving political 
debate over diverse visions for the future society and the articulation of principles and 
identification of appropriate historical actors to realize such visions. From this dis 
cursive process, the workers, previously disdained as lacking class consciousness and 
subjectivity, were endowed with a new collective social identity and subjectivity and 
with a potential for revolutionary vision and action. The practice of the alliance was 
beset by the unrelenting tension between the intellectuals' desire for organic fusion 
with the workers and the practical demands of leading the workers. Amid these 
conflicting desires and demands, labor was catapulted into the central position in the 
1980s' democratization movement. At the same time, however, for many undong 
kw?n, privileging labor was more a symbol of their commitment and devotion than 
an actual program for revolution. 
The problems related to the intellectuals' representation of workers in this process, 
while arising from a particular set of historical and sociopolitical arrangements and 
inner dynamics of the undongkw?n, also point to the inherent difficulties of repre 
sentation in general. As Lazarus points out, it would be irresponsible to suggest that 
the division between the intellectual and the worker can be resolved theoretically 
without first being dissolved by the transformation of society (1994, 211). One cannot 
deny that the very decision of the intellectuals to "move over," to revert back to their 
nonworker social category, for whatever reason, was possible because of their privileged 
social position. As Alcoff reminds us, the decision to retreat from social engagement 
is not an abdication of privilege, but an "extension or application" of it (1991-92, 
24-25). Although few intellectuals still call themselves undongkw?n, social move 
ments today still have to deal with their material and discursive impact. As socio 
political structures and intellectual paradigms shift, their words will be reinterpreted 
to remain historically meaningful and relevant. The undongkw?n may have retreated, 
but the responsibility and impact of their words remain. 
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